The aerospace industry is striving to reduce the aircraft operating costs while maintaining required safety level. Emerging technologies such as the structural health monitoring to reduce long-term maintenance cost and increase aircraft availability are promoted by the manufacturers. To successfully integrate the structural health monitoring technology into the current maintenance process of modern commercial aviation, a clear definition of the structural-health-monitoring-based maintenance operational concept and the system level requirements is required. This article proposed a structural health monitoring operational concept and the associated maintenance cost modeling and risk assessment methods for the implementation of the structural health monitoring in commercial aviation industry. The developed methodology provides a tool to determine the optimal scheduled structural health monitoring inspection interval and repair decision thresholds for approved scheduled structural health monitoring task. A simulated case study is carried out to demonstrate the structural health monitoring operational concept and how an optimal maintenance strategy can be determined using the proposed methodology. Preliminary results show that the integration of the structural health monitoring into the existing maintenance process can reduce the maintenance cost compared to that of the current practice using the traditional Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) techniques while maintaining the risk below an acceptable level.
Introduction
The implementation of an appropriate maintenance program is critical for airlines to reduce operating cost while achieving high standards of safety and reliable services. 1 Currently, the methodology for commercial aircraft maintenance program development is mainly based on the maintenance steering group (MSG-3). 2 As the aircraft health management (AHM) and structural health monitoring (SHM) have a high potential to improve the maintenance processes toward a more cost-effective approach, the aircraft manufacturers and operators now show increasing interest on the structure/system health monitoring technologies. 3, 4 SHM has the potential to shift the scheduled manually structure inspection to automated monitoring, thus reducing aircraft inspection costs and minimizing downtime. The industry has made an effort to introduce the SHM into the aircraft maintenance program development process, which is mainly based on MSG-3 methodology currently. Following the progress made with SHM, a dedicated A4A MSG-3 SHM working group is launched to develop the MSG-3 revision to facilitate the incorporation of SHM. The revision is finally approved by the International Maintenance Review Board Policy Board (IMRBPB) allowing the consideration of SHM applications in the commercial aviation maintenance programs in 2009. 5 However, by itself it was not considered sufficient to assure a successful implementation of SHM in a commercial aviation maintenance program. Further issues that currently prevent the implementation of SHM include the lack of accepted industry practices and certification guidance as well as the associated issues arising from the introduction of new methods into the traditional aircraft maintenance process, such as the business cases. s6-8 As for the industry practices and certification guidance, a SAE international Aerospace Recommended Practices document, that is, SAE ARP 6461, 9 is developed hopefully to serve as a common reference for OEM manufacturers, regulatory authorities, and other stakeholders involved in the development and certification of SHM solutions for commercial aviation. The new guidance provides generic information on the integration of SHM into aircraft maintenance procedures, requirements and advice on validation, verification, and airworthiness that are compliant with the prevailing aviation regulations and aircraft structural design and maintenance practices. 10 Another challenge is to show the airlines what would be the real benefits of introducing SHM into their current operations, which is mainly with scheduled inspection-based methods. 6 The integration of SHM with current maintenance process would of course need to be considered in the context of overall aircraft scheduled maintenance in practice. 7 Speckmann and Daniel 11 summarized the challenges and benefits of SHM for an airliner under in-service conditions and proposed a progressive introduction of SHM into the aeronautical industry. Pattabhiraman et al. 12 developed a CBM-skip strategy to skip unnecessary scheduled structure maintenance using an on-board SHM system and argued that the strategy has the potential to lead to substantial cost saving over the traditional scheduled maintenance. Furthermore, a similar study was carried out by Cot et al. 13 using a new probabilistic analytical mode instead of the Monte Carlo method used in Pattabhiraman et al. 12 Fitzwater et al. presented a cost/ benefit analysis of SHM on a specific damage-tolerant structure of F-15 fighter aircraft by integrating of SHM with traditional scheduled structure maintenance. The authors concluded it is unlikely that one-off conditional solutions are cost-effective and a systems approach encompassing many structural issues into a larger system might be more advantageous. 14 Kapoor et al. proposed a method of analyzing scheduled maintenance interval blocks of commercial aircraft to identify critical maintenance inspection items for SHM application. The study shows that significant benefits are likely to occur within shorter, more frequent scheduled maintenance intervals where inspections were intensive but specific to an area. 15 Piotrowski et al. presented the Delta's efforts and lessons learned to implement the SHM into an airline existing maintenance program, where Delta envisions three distinct phases of SHM acceptance for the commercial aviation industry. The 'Hot Spot' monitoring for a particular structural detail at the same schedule as current maintenance (i.e. scheduled SHM (S-SHM)) is the first step required to transition from a scheduled maintenance system to a true condition and prognosticsbased maintenance program (i.e. automated SHM (A-SHM)).
8 From Embraer's perspective, starting with S-SHM applications would be to avoid the majority of the issues related to the current regulations and the disruption to traditional maintenance process. 3 Boeing and the Air Force Research Laboratory are also developing methods for implementing SHM system for various applications particularity at known structural problem areas, called ''Hot Spots.'' 7, 14 The successful implementation of SHM will depend on how effectively they will be combined with the existing maintenance program in modern commercial aviation, while maintaining, or even improving the safety. Presenting a solid business case for the SHM considering the current commercial aviation maintenance practice is still a great challenge and has yet to be fully addressed. This article focusing on the business case proposed an operational concept and the associated maintenance cost modeling and risk assessment methods for the integration of S-SHM into the commercial aircraft maintenance process, based on which the maintenance cost and structure failure risk over the lifetime of an aircraft is evaluated, and further an optimal S-SHM-based maintenance strategy can be determined. The article is organized as follows. Section ''Aircraft maintenance program development methodology considering SHM'' briefly introduces the MSG-3 methodology for aircraft maintenance program development and its approved revision for the incorporation of the SHM. Section ''Maintenance cost modeling and risk assessment'' presents the modeling methods when integrating the S-SHM with the airline current scheduled maintenance program. An S-SHM operational concept on a Hot Spot of commercial aircraft structure is developed in section ''Case study on a Hot Spot of commercial aircraft'' and the benefits of application of SHM to the Hot Spot as well as the specific system requirements are established. Finally, conclusions are drawn in the final section.
Aircraft maintenance program development methodology considering SHM
Maintenance is the combination of technical, administrative, and managerial actions carried out during the life cycle of a system. There are different maintenance strategies, for example, corrective, preventive, and proactive maintenance. 16 Preventive maintenance strategy is carried out at predetermined intervals or according to prescribed criteria and is intended to reduce the probability of failure or the degradation of the function of an item. The complete collection of these preventive maintenance tasks is termed scheduled maintenance program, which is scheduled typically in the design and manufacturing stage. The modern commercial aircraft scheduled maintenance program is developed mainly based on the MSG-3 methodology.
2 MSG-3 outlines the general organization and decision processes for determining the initial scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals which will be acceptable to the regulatory authorities, the operators, and the manufacturers. Typically, the initial scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals have been specified in Maintenance Review Board Reports (MRBR), which outlines the minimum scheduled maintenance and inspection requirements for the structures, engines, systems, and components of a given aircraft type, with the intent of maintaining the inherent safety and reliability of the aircraft. As operating experience is accumulated, additional adjustments to the initial scheduled maintenance program may be made by the operator to maintain efficient scheduled maintenance. An efficient program is one which schedules only those tasks necessary to meet the stated objectives.
SHM systems that are certified for their intended function may be used to ensure inherent airworthiness of the item being monitored. SHM systems are classified by operation mode and technology type. 5, 17 Operation mode, for example, ''scheduled'' or ''automated,'' classifies how the SHM system interacts with maintenance personnel, while technology type, for example, ''damage monitoring'' or ''operation monitoring, ' ' describes what sort of conditions the system measures. S-SHM is a SHM system that is interrogated by maintenance personnel in order to function at a fixed interval. A-SHM is any SHM which does not have a predetermined interval at which maintenance action is carried out, but instead relies on the system to inform the personnel to perform maintenance. Damage monitoring system uses sensors to directly monitor structure/system for deterioration conditions. Operation monitoring system uses sensors which do not directly check the structure/system for damage/degradation, but instead correlate various measurements (e.g. environment conditions, loads) to make an inference to the probability or likelihood of damage/degradation.
The introduction of the SHM will change the existing maintenance task analysis procedure currently based on the MSG-3 methodology. Following the MSG-3 concept, the A-SHM falls into unscheduled tasks, while S-SHM by definition directly associated with scheduled tasks. When a health monitoring system is used to monitor the item which has maintenance requirements and the damage detection requirement is being satisfied by the monitoring system, the scheduled maintenance task carried out by personnel may be replaced by an S-SHM task or A-SHM with no scheduled task then listed in the MRBR task list. Therefore, the classic scheduled operational check (OP)/visual check (VC) tasks or inspection check (IN)/functional check (FC) tasks need further analysis taking alternative SHM technologies into account. The development of the scheduled maintenance program is extended to include S-SHM type tasks for deterioration detection, and some other scheduled tasks may be covered by A-SHM system, and are finally excluded from the list of the scheduled maintenance tasks. Considering the emerging SHM technologies, the aircraft maintenance program development flowchart is given in Figure 1 .
As part of the MSG-3 structural maintenance development procedure, applicable and effective structural maintenance tasks are selected for each deterioration process of the structural significant item (SSI), for example, accidental damage (AD), environmental deterioration (ED), fatigue damage (FD), and corrosion and wear (C&W). Emerging technology, such as SHM may be an option to check or watch for AD, ED, and/or FD where demonstrated to be applicable and effective. 17 The structure maintenance program development logic considering SHM is presented in Figure 2 . In some cases when the S-SHM system is available and its capabilities meet or exceed the detection requirements of the SSI, the classic inspection task for the SSI could be replaced by S-SHM task. The S-SHM system reads-out a SHM device at a fixed interval to check the SSI's conditions against predefined limits. The S-SHM is still a scheduled maintenance task and appears on the structure scheduled maintenance tasks list. In other cases when an A-SHM is used to monitor the SSI which has inspection requirements, and the damage detection requirement is satisfied by the monitoring system, the classic scheduled inspection task for the SSI could be replaced by A-SHM, which can automatically inform the personnel to initiate maintenance action. If the overall detection requirements of the SSI are met by A-SHM system, then no more scheduled task is listed in the MRBR for the SSI.
Currently, regular maintenance is carried out to maintain (or restore) the aircraft structures, systems, and components in an airworthy condition according to the manufacturer's instructions, such as the MRBR, which contains the minimum required maintenance tasks and when they should be carried out. Traditionally, these maintenance tasks are divided into categories. For example, ''line,'' ''A,'' ''B,'' ''C,'' and ''D,'' enabling aircraft operators to plan regular inspections at predetermined timetable. Taking the A320 aircraft as an example, each ''C'' check is scheduled to occur every 18-20 months, or every 6000 flight hours, or every 3000 flight cycles, whichever comes first. During these scheduled checks, airframe (structural and non-structural), power plants, and components are inspected and maintained at the depot. Therefore, once the S-SHM tasks are incorporated as part of an aircraft MRBR, they will need to be retrofitted into the airliner's existing maintenance process, where methods are required to determine the optimal scope and frequencies of each approved S-SHM task, and how they will effectively replace or complement the classic maintenance tasks types. 6 Maintenance cost modeling and risk assessment
Integration of S-SHM with airline maintenance program
Currently, the continued airworthiness of the aircraft structure is maintained by a comprehensive set of predefined scheduled inspection tasks, which are obtained using the durability and damage tolerance analysis technology. The approach uses a combination of estimated load spectrum, structural analysis, fatigue testing, and NDE methods to determine key inspection locations, and how often inspections should be conducted. 7, 18 Structural detail or element FD is typically characterized as the initiation of a crack, with subsequent propagation relating to aircraft usage. A robust inspection program is required being capable of timely detection of crack initial and subsequent growth to maintained the safety. At the initial period, the crack growth rate is low, where an inspection threshold with respect to different inspection techniques such as the general visual inspections (GVI), detailed inspection (DET), or special detailed inspection (SDI), is determined to detect an initial crack size. Crack growth analysis and criteria are then used to set regular inspection intervals in order to detect or prevent cracks from growing to critical size. In case the damage passed the predefined limit, that is, the restoration limit, that ensures safe operation until the subsequent inspection, the items then must be restored. Consequently, the item shown in Figure 3 will not be restored at the time of Insp. No. 2, since the restoration limit was not reached and the crack growth after Insp. No. 2 is believed to stay below the operational safety limit before Insp. No. 3 based on comprehensive fatigue life, crack growth, and residual strength evaluations.
The inspection interval and the restoration limit are interdependent and set by a trade-off between of failure risk and cost. More frequent inspection may improve the safety, while leading to higher cost. The introduction of the S-SHM to autonomously perform inspections more frequently offers the potential to reduce the number of labor-intensive manual inspections as is done with current inspection methods. However, false call of repair (FCR) from a SHM system may cause unnecessary maintenance actions, thus raising cost and aircraft availability concerns. Particularly, a great cost may be incurred due to the unscheduled operation interruption to confirm the SHM finding or repair the item when in the field. More rigorous methods and tools, which consider the damage growth behavior, SHM system performance, restoration limit, and inspection intervals in the context of current aircraft scheduled maintenance practices, are required to develop an effective S-SHM integration strategy which can limit the failure risk of structures while minimizing the maintenance cost.
Risk assessment
Risk assessment provides a mechanism for maintaining aircraft structural below an acceptable level of risk and balancing cost. In this approach, a maintenance strategy is analyzed using the probabilistic damage tolerance analysis (PDTA) method to determine whether a specified level of safety is maintained, as measured by single flight probability of failure (SFPOF). SFPOF has been the recommended risk measure for PDTA since 1980. 19 For a single component, SFPOF is the probability that a structural failure will occur during the specified future flight, given that the structure has survived to that flight. 20 SFPOF is explicitly defined as the following
where t is the flight of interest, f i represents failure of flight i, and f i represents survival of flight i. The SFPOF concept is central to PDTA and has been the recommended risk measure for PDTA in practice. In this article, an SFPOF threshold of 10 27 per flight is utilized as an acceptable level of risk threshold for the structure Hot Spot of interest. 12, 20 Several public or proprietary PDTA software packages, such as PROF, 21 RBDMS, 22 and RPI, 23 exist with the goal to estimate SFPOF for each flight in the service life. In PROF, a hazard rate approach is used to calculating SFPOF. 20 In this study, a more flexible PDTA modeling methodology using a particle-based approximation and the sequential importance sampling algorithm proposed by Halbert and Fitzwater 20 is adopted. The life cycle for a structural feature is simulated flight-by-flight, only moving on to the next flight in the service life if the current flight survives. Each life cycle is represented by a single Monte Carlo trial. When failure occurs, the trial is stopped. Then, the SFPOF can be estimated straightforward for any selected flight given enough trials of the MC routine. Suppose there are n trials, t is the flight of interest, g i is the first flight to failure for trial i, and I(Á) is an indicator function that is equal to 1 when the statement is TRUE, 0 otherwise. 20 SFPOF can then be estimated using the following formula
This new methodology has the potential to provide a more accurate risk assessment and the likelihood of repairs throughout the service life due to its increased flexibility when utilizing a simulation-based approach. 20 For transport category airplanes, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) also proposed several measures of risk for risk management in accordance with the Transport Airplane Risk Assessment Methodology (TARAM). 24 One of the key measures of risk is the uncorrected fleet risk, which is the number of weighted events expected over the life of the airplane fleet if no corrective action is taken. The uncorrected fleet risk is calculated over the life of the fleet to determine whether corrective action should be mandated. It can also be calculated for the proposed control program to determine whether the corrective action is effective in mitigating the risk. 25 For a given defect or damage state, the uncorrected fleet risk R T is calculated as
where P is the probability of occurrence of the defect condition for a given fleet during a defined period, P C is the conditional probabilities leading to unsafe outcomes given the defect condition, and S is the severity of the unsafe outcome, typically in terms of a specific measure called injury ratio, which is the average rate of fatality per person exposed to a specific unsafe outcome. Injury ratios for a range of transport airplane unsafe outcomes are typically derived from the historical record of the unsafe outcomes. For the conditional probabilities, all the individual conditional probabilities for all the conditions leading to the airplane-level unsafe outcome due to the defect should be considered, which is typically determined using historical operating data or test data. Expert opinion, analysis, and simulation may also be used if sufficient historical data are unavailable. 24 The fleet risk provides a long-term forecast of future risk for a fleet during a defined time period, which can help to determine whether an unsafe condition might exist and is used to guide the decision for corrective actions. The TARAM proposed risk-level guidance for mandated corrective action for transport airplane fleets primarily used in commercial passenger operations is 0.02. That means if the uncorrected fleet risk exceeds 0.02 for commercial operations, a mandating airworthiness directive should be issued to mitigate the unsafe condition. In this study, besides the abovementioned SFPOF, in this article the fleet risk is adopted as another measure to determine whether a specified level of safety is maintained for a maintenance strategy.
Maintenance cost modeling
For a given structural feature, there are many maintenance strategies which are capable of maintaining both the SFPOF and the fleet risk below acceptable threshold, thus maintenance cost is an important criteria to compare various acceptable maintenance strategies. A cost model is developed to quantify the savings of different maintenance strategies over the traditional scheduled maintenance. In this model, the sources of maintenance cost are the inspections, repairs, and false calls of repair.
Inspection cost. The cost of an individual inspection is the labor rate multiplied by the labor hours which is typically provided in the maintenance planning documents. Thus, for one maintenance strategy with m inspections scheduled in the service life, the expected total inspection cost is
where c
is the cost of the jth inspection. Since the advanced SHM methods are autonomous and, in general, require less time than conventional NDE methods, the inspection cost can be significantly reduced by the introduction of the SHM into the maintenance strategy.
Repair cost. The repair cost generally includes material and labor costs. It should be noted that at each scheduled inspection there is some possibility associated with finding a crack, that is, the probability of crack detection (PCD), and another possibility associated with repairing a crack, which is represented by the probability of crack repair (PCR) in this study. In most of the studies, 14, 20, 26 it is assumed that a crack will be immediately repaired once it is found, where the PCR is essentially equal to PCD. However, in some aircraft programs, for example, the modern commercial aviation, the repair may be delayed for a period of time depending on if the crack has reached the restoration limit, where the PCR is different from the PCD in this context. Thus, for a given maintenance strategy including m inspections, the expected total cost due to repairs is
R is the cost of performing repair at the jth inspection. It should be noted that the repair cost may significantly vary depending on if the inspection occurs in the field or at the maintenance depot. A large additional cost may be caused due to the unscheduled operation interruption and downtime for the repair in field. p ( j ) R is the PCR at the jth inspection, defined as the follows
where f(a) is the probability density of the crack size at the inspection time, and POR(a) is defined here as the probability of repair (POR) function yielding the probability of repairing a crack of length a. The POR is derived from the probability of detection (POD) function for characterizing the detection capability of a NDE or SHM system. A general log-normal form POR is defined as
where the parameter s is derived from the NDE or SHM system test data using the methodology recommended by the handbook 1823A, 27 and m here is set to the log value of the repair decision threshold, that is, the restoration limit a res , above which a repair is called and below which repair is not necessary. Apparently, for a maintenance strategy, raising the restoration limit will result in a low POR as well a reduced number of FCR events.
FCR cost. If a POR function is developed according to the above-mentioned method, there will be a FCR rate associated with each inspection due to the limited detection capability of the NDE or SHM system. A FCR is defined as a call of repair from the inspection that a crack has reached the restoration limit, when in fact it is not. The FCR rate can impact the maintenance costs of the aircraft as each FCR will result in additional cost due to unnecessary investigation or repair, particularly at the field inspection. For a given maintenance strategy including m inspections, the expected total cost due to FCR is
FCR is the cost of a FCR varying with the inspection occurs in the field or the maintenance depot.
Case study on a Hot Spot of commercial aircraft

S-SHM operational concept
The proposed operational concept, integrating S-SHM into the existing airline maintenance program, is presented in Figure 4 . Currently, for a typical short-range airplane (e.g. A320), regular structural maintenance is typically performed during C-and D-Checks of the airplane at the depot, when non-structural airframes and components are inspected and maintained synchronously. During these scheduled downtimes, the structure can be inspected using advanced SHM or conventional DNE methods. If the detected crack size exceeds the restoration limit at depot inspection a res,depot , repair is carried out immediately to restore the structure. At the inspection time, PCR is estimated according to equation (5) . For the S-SHM inspection which is more frequently performed in the field, unscheduled maintenance will be required if the detected crack size (real or false) passes the field restoration limit a res,field . It should be noted that the repair in the field will be much costlier than that in the depot. So, a straightforward idea is to assign relatively larger value to a res,field than a res,depot in order to increase the chance of repairing cracks at the depot and decrease the costlier unscheduled maintenance in the field as much as possible while maintaining risk below an acceptable level. The SFPOF for each flight is calculated using the particle-filtering-based PDTA approach developed by Halbert and Fitzwater. 20 The maintenance strategy will be unacceptable if the SFPOF exceeds 10 27 at any time in the service life of the structure. The uncorrected fleet risk, which quantifies the total risk of an unsafe condition for the airplanes in the fleet, is calculated using the FAA TARAM method. 24 According to the guidance in TARAM, it is unacceptable if the fleet risk exceeds 0.02 for commercial passenger operations. Finally, preference between acceptable strategies is based on the maintenance cost calculated according to the models described in section ''Maintenance cost modeling.''
Comparison of S-SHM maintenance strategies
The life cycle of a typical short-range transport aircraft is modeled, focusing on the fatigue life of a structure Hot Spot owing to crack growth. A typical structural maintenance schedule for such an airplane (e.g. Airbus A320) is presented in Figure 3 with 12,000FC as the threshold for the first inspection and 3000FC as the repeat inspection interval. Since detailed modeling of the Hot Spot is outside the scope of this work, a generic damage tolerance analysis example, that is, the CP7ext, adapted from Halbert and Fitzwater 20 is used to model the crack initiation and propagation of a Hot Spot. Several parameters of this example data set are lightly modified so that the adjustments can verify certain empirical constraints, such as the SFPOF is maintained below 10 27 for each flight in the service life under the conventional maintenance schedule using the state-ofthe-art NDE technology (shown in Figure 7 ). For the calculation of the fleet risk, the data from an example analysis presented in Violette et al. 25 are adopted, where the summaries of P C Á S for all the possible unsafe outcomes due to a critical structure Hot Spot crack propagation is 0.0023.
In this simulated case study, a fleet of 1000 airplanes with retirement lives of 60,000 flight cycles is considered. At the inspection time, the PCR is calculated according to equations (5) and (6), where the real data sets form a state-of-the-art NDE system 27 and an insitu SHM system 26 are analyzed to produce the POR curves, respectively. The parameters of POR model are derived from the data sets using the methodology developed in handbook 1823A, 27 except the repair decision threshold (i.e. the restoration limit), which is determined manually. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the POR curves with corresponding FCR rates utilizing different repair decision thresholds for the SHM and NDE system, respectively. For example, for the SHM system given the repair decision threshold of 0.107, the FCR rate is 4.8%.
During the scheduled maintenance, such as the CChecks, labor-intensive inspections using current NDE methods may be carried out to identify the damage to restore. If the inspection is performed using the onboard SHM equipment instead, inspection cost can be significantly reduced. However, the unscheduled maintenance requested by the S-SHM in the field, which can be quite disruptive of the airline operation, will be much more expensive than the scheduled maintenance. In this study for illustration only, the NDE inspection cost is US$1000, the SHM inspection cost is US$50, the depot repair cost is $2000, and the field repair cost is US$10,000.
The particle-filtering-based PDTA approach is adopted to calculate the SFPOF as well as the PCR at each scheduled inspection, which is performed using the traditional NDE methods. The SFPOF and PCR with different repair decision thresholds for NDE inspection at the depot are presented in Figure 7 . During these scheduled inspections, a crack once detected with size exceeding the restoration limit will be repaired immediately, and the associated possibility of repairing a crack is represented by the PCR shown in the bottom plot of Figure 7 . It can be seen from the figure that a larger repair decision threshold or restoration limit will result in a lower PCR at each inspection, which means less repair cost in the depot maintenance, however at the cost of higher SFPOF risk. Detailed result is given in Table 1 . It should be noted that the traditional NDE method has a near zero FCR rate; therefore, the corresponding FCR cost can be neglected in this analysis. It can be also observed from Table 1 that increasing the repair decision threshold to reduce the repair cost as well as the total cost will lead to a higher level of risk. Therefore, based on Table 1 , a cost-effective maintenance strategy using the state-of-the-art NDE method (shaded in Table 1 ), which minimizes the cost while maintaining both the SFPOF and fleet risk below acceptable levels, can be determined to serve as a baseline strategy further analysis in the follows.
The introduction of S-SHM provides the potential to further reduce the maintenance cost, while maintaining the same safety level by performing more frequent inspections with less cost. However, more frequent inspection means more chance that an unscheduled maintenance event may be required by the SHM in filed. The SFPOF and PCR estimation of three S-SHM maintenance strategies with various inspection frequencies and repair decision thresholds are shown in Figure 8 . For the maintenance strategy with a res = 0.143, FCR = 0.09%, and I = 3000FC, which means performing the inspection at each C-Check (I = 3000FC) using the SHM system with near zero FCR instead of the NDE equipment, the inspection cost is significantly reduced compared to that of the NDE-based baseline strategy, but both the SFPOF and the fleet risk exceed the acceptable level. One way to reduce the risk is to perform the automated S-SHM inspection more frequently, for example, at the interval of 1000FC rather than only at the C-Check (represented by the solid line in Figure 8 ), but with a subsequent increase in the inspection cost and a significant field unscheduled maintenance cost. The detailed cost breakdown for this maintenance strategy with a res = 0.143, FCR = 0.09%, and I = 1000FC are shown in the left plot of Figure 9 . It can be observed from the plot that most of the maintenance cost can be attributed to the costlier unscheduled filed repair required by the SHM system, which finally results in a higher total cost than the baseline strategy. Another way to reduce the risk is to perform the S-SHM inspection during each C-Check in the depot but with a lower repair decision threshold, for example, a res = 0.069. Setting the repair decision threshold lower to tolerate a smaller crack length will increase the number of FCRs due to the limited crack detection capability of the in-situ SHM system compared with the NDE equipment, which will finally lead to a significant FCR cost. It can be seen from the right plot of Figure 9 for this strategy nearly half of the total maintenance cost is resulted from the false call events in the depot. Figure 10 shows the variation of the cost of the S-SHM-based maintenance strategies with different repair decision thresholds and inspection interval. It is observed that increasing the repair decision threshold or the inspection interval will result in a reduction in maintenance cost but a concurrent increase in the risk as shown in Figure 11 . Note that a specified level of safety should be maintained for an acceptable maintenance strategy. Therefore, a cost-effective strategy with acceptable risk can be determined, where a res = 0.078, I = 3000FC, and FCR = 39.65%. For this S-SHMbased strategy, the total maintenance cost, max SFPOF, and fleet risk are 15,708, 7.4E-08, and 0.0004, respectively. Considering the costlier repair in the field than that in the depot, it is ideal for a cost-effective strategy to carry out all the repairs during the scheduled C-Check, that is, I = 3000FC, but at the expense of a higher FCR rate and associated FCR cost due to the limited damage detection capability of the in-situ SHM system. Therefore, for an effective integration of the S-SHM with the airline's existing maintenance program, it is worthy to take efforts to improve the performance of the SHM system comparable to that of the traditional NDE equipment. Using an improved SHM system with a high sensitivity but low false alarm rate will further reduce the life cycle maintenance cost by shifting most of the repairs to the scheduled downtimes (e.g. the C/D-Checks,) while still maintaining a low FCR cost. For a given SHM system, the probability of repairing crack and the associated FCR can be altered by just adjusting the repair decision threshold of the software; therefore, different repair decision thresholds can be adopted for field and depot inspection. For example, a compromising strategy may use a high repair decision threshold in field and a relatively lower one in depot in order to shift the structure repairs to the depot as much as possible, while maintaining an acceptable FCR rate to avoid the high depot FCR cost. Figure 12 shows the maintenance cost and max SFPOF vary as the field and depot repair decision threshold change when the S-SHM inspection is performed at the interval of 1000FC. An optimization of the field and depot repair decision thresholds can be performed to identify a maintenance strategy which minimizes the costs while maintaining the acceptable level of safety.
Detailed results for the S-SHM (I = 1000FC) strategies with varied field and depot repair thresholds are summarized in Tables 2-4. Note that an acceptable strategy should maintain both the SFPOF and fleet risk below a specified level, that is, 10 27 and 0.02, respectively. Therefore, the strategies exceeding neither of the risk thresholds are excluded from the alternatives (shaded values in Tables 2-4) . Then, the optimal strategy with S-SHM inspection interval of 1000FC which minimizes costs while maintaining the required safety level can be determined based on Table 4 . This procedure can be repeated to find the optimal strategy for each S-SHM inspection interval, for example, 500FC, 1000FC, 1500FC, and 3000FC. Finally, the most costeffective maintenance strategy with acceptable risk level is identified (bold values in Tables 2-4) , and the details of the strategy and its associated cost breakdowns are given in Table 5 . Compared to the NDE-based baseline strategy presented in Table 1 , the most cost-effective S-SHM strategy identified in this study can provide a risk acceptable maintenance strategy with less cost, however at the expense of a higher fleet risk than the baseline one. It should be noted that the quantitative threshold values from the guidelines, for example, the TARAM handbook, 24 are not, and have never been, the airworthiness authority's goals or thresholds for the actual risk of the transport airplanes in service. The actual probability of a failure condition is far less than the thresholds listed in the guidelines and this expectation has been validated by the operational history of the certified transport airplanes. 24 Therefore to provide equivalent safety level of in-service transport airplane actually achieved through the baseline maintenance strategy using the state-of-the-art NDE methods, an alternative optimal maintenance strategy with equivalent or even lower risk level is identified and the strategy details are also given in Table 5 .
Summary and conclusion
The manufacturers are promoting SHM to reduce longterm maintenance cost and increase aircraft availability. Significant efforts, ranging from design to deployment, performance, and certification, are still needed to assure the successful incorporation of SHM into the highly regulated aviation industry. Considering the prevalent maintenance process in modern commercial aviation, starting with S-SHM applications would be the first step to implement the SHM into an airline maintenance program.
An S-SHM operational concept and associated maintenance cost modeling and risk assessment methods are proposed in this article for the integration of S-SHM with the existing airline maintenance program. The developed decision support tools can help to determine the optimal S-SHM inspection interval and repair decision thresholds of each approved S-SHM task. This is significant for the SHM system design requirements development. A simulated case study is carried out to demonstrate the S-SHM operational concept and how an optimal maintenance strategy can be determined. Various S-SHM maintenance strategies are evaluated to identify the optimal maintenance approach. Preliminary results on a Hot Spot of a hypothetical transport airplane show that the integration of the S-SHM with different field and depot repair thresholds into the existing maintenance program can reduce the maintenance cost by 42% compared to that of the current practice using state-of-the-art NDE methods, while maintaining the risk below an acceptable level. To provide an equivalent safety level achieved by the current practice using the NDE methods, the maintenance cost can be reduced by 30%.
This article presents an overview of the challenges to introduce SHM in the maintenance program of commercial aircraft. Besides the efforts for validation, and verification of the SHM systems, developing a costeffective solution will be the first step required for acceptance and widespread adoption of SHM in commercial aviation industry. Focusing how SHM applications can be successfully integrated into an airline existing maintenance programs, an S-SHM solution on ''Hot Spot'' is presented to demonstrate the potential to reduce aircraft maintenance costs. However, for the airline, the largest cost-benefit lies in the true conditionbased maintenance, that is, an A-SHM, which can automatically inform the personnel to initiate maintenance action. Developing business cases around A-SHM solution will be the next step for future study. 
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